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ABSTRACT 
A country’s mix of products predicts its subsequent pattern of diversification and 
economic growth. But does this product mix also predict income inequality? Here we 
combine methods from econometrics, network science, and economic complexity to show 
that countries exporting complex products—as measured by the Economic Complexity 
Index—have lower levels of income inequality than countries exporting simpler products. 
Using multivariate regression analysis, we show that economic complexity is a significant 
and negative predictor of income inequality and that this relationship is robust to 
controlling for aggregate measures of income, institutions, export concentration, and 
human capital. Moreover, we introduce a measure that associates a product to a level of 
income inequality equal to the average GINI of the countries exporting that product 
(weighted by the share the product represents in that country’s export basket). We use this 
measure together with the network of related products—or product space—to illustrate 
how the development of new products is associated with changes in income inequality. 
These findings show that economic complexity captures information about an economy’s 
level of development that is relevant to the ways an economy generates and distributes its 
income. Moreover, these findings suggest that a country’s productive structure may limit 
its range of income inequality. Finally, we make our results available through an online 
resource that allows for its users to visualize the structural transformation of over 150 
countries and their associated changes in income inequality between 1963 and 2008. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Is a country’s ability to both generate and distribute income determined by its productive 
structure? Economic development pioneers, like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Hans Singer, and 
Albert Hirschman, would have said yes, since they argued in favor of a connection 
between a country’s productive structure, and its ability to generate and distribute income. 
These pioneers emphasized the economic role of “structural transformations”—the 
process by which economies diversify from agriculture and extractive industries to more 
sophisticated forms of services and manufacturing (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Singer, 
1950; Hirschman, 1958).  
 
But testing the intuition of these development pioneers has not been easy due to the 
complexity of measuring a country’s productive structure. During the twentieth century, 
scholars did not go beyond simple quantitative approaches, such as (a) measuring the 
fraction of an economy employed in agriculture, manufacturing, or services; (b) using 
aggregate measures of diversity and concentration (Hirschman, 1945; Herfindahl, 1950; 
Imbs & Wacziarg, 2003); or (c) looking at diversification into related and unrelated 
varieties—that is, diversification into similar or different products (Teece et al., 1994; 
Frenken, Oort & Verburg, 2007; Saviotti & Frenken, 2008; Boschma & Iammarino, 
2009). These measures of a country’s productive structure, however, fail to take the 
sophistication of the products into account, or capture differences in industrial structures 
in a manner that is too coarse (i.e. by defining broad categories such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, and services). 
 
Recently, though, the introduction of measures of ‘economic complexity’—which we 
define and explain in the data and methods section below—have expanded our ability to 
quantify a country’s productive structure and have revived interest in the macroeconomic 
role of structural transformations (Rodrik, 2006; Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik, 2006; 
Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Felipe, 2009; Abdon & Felipe, 2011; 
Bustos et al., 2012; Caldarelli et al., 2012; Tacchella et al., 2012; Cristelli et al., 2013; 
Hausmann et al., 2014; Cristelli, Tacchella & Pietronero, 2015). These measures of 
economic complexity have received wide attention because they are highly predictive of 
future economic growth (ibid.). This also makes these measures of economic complexity 
relevant for social welfare, since economic growth and average income are correlated with 
country’s absolute levels of poverty and social welfare (Bourguignon, 2004; Ravallion, 
2004). 
 
However, there are also multiple reasons why the productive structures of countries could 
be associated not only with economic growth, but also with a country’s average level of 
income inequality.  
 
First, the mix of products that an economy makes constrains the occupational choices, 
learning opportunities, and bargaining power of its workers and unions. Notably, in 
several emerging economies, technological catch-up and industrialization have provided 
new jobs and learning opportunities for workers, contributing to the rise of a new middle 
class (Milanovic, 2012). Conversely in several “industrialized” economies, de-
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industrialization, de-unionization, and rising global competition for the export of industrial 
goods have contributed to higher levels of income inequality. In the industrialized 
economies many industrial workers have become unemployed or were forced to work at 
low paying jobs, and the ability of unions to compress wage inequality has decreased 
(Gustafsson & Johansson, 1999; Acemoglu, Aghion & Violante, 2001). 
 
Second, recent work on productive structures has highlighted that the complexity and 
diversity of products a country exports are a good proxy of the knowledge and knowhow 
available in an economy that is not captured by aggregate measures of human capital 
(Hidalgo, 2015)—such as the years of schooling or the percentage of the population with 
tertiary education. Moreover, productive structures can also be understood as a proxy of 
an economy’s level of social capital and the health of its institutions, since the ability of a 
country to produce sophisticated products also critically depends on the ability of people 
to form social and professional networks (Hidalgo, 2015, Fukuyama 1995). For this 
reason, complex industrial products also tend to require a large degree of tacit knowledge 
and more distributed knowledge than found with simple products that are mainly based on 
resource richness or low labor costs. More distributed knowledge and a large degree of 
tacit knowledge can enhance the incentives to unionize and increase the effectiveness in 
negotiating high wages and therefore compress wage inequality. 
 
Third, in a world in which economic power begets political power, non-diverse 
economies—such as countries with incomes largely based on few natural resources—are 
more susceptible to suffer from both economic and political capture (Engerman & 
Sokoloff, 1997; Collier, 2007; Hartmann, 2014).  
 
Here, we contribute to the literature on economic complexity, income inequality, and 
structural transformations, by documenting a strong, robust, and stable correlation 
between a country’s level of economic complexity (as proxied by the Economic 
Complexity Index) and its level of income inequality between 1963 and 2008. We find 
this correlation is robust to controlling for a variety of factors that are expected to explain 
cross-country variations in income inequality, such as a country’s level of education, 
institutions, and export concentration. Moreover we find that, over time, countries that 
experience increases in economic complexity are more likely to experience decreases in 
their level of income inequality. We develop a product level index to estimate the changes 
in the level of income inequality that we would expect if a country were to modify its 
product mix by adding or removing a product. Our results suggest that a country’s level of 
income inequality may be conditioned by its productive structure. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
economic development, institutions and income inequality. Section 3 presents the data and 
methods used in this paper. Section 4 compares the correlations between Gini and a 
variety of measures of productive structures, including the Economic Complexity Index 
(Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Hirschman, 1945, 
Herfindahl, 1950), Entropy (Shannon, 1948), and the Fitness Index (Tacchella et al., 
2012). This section then uses multivariate regressions and panel regressions to estimate 
the correlation between economic complexity and income inequality that is not explained 
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by the correlation between income inequality and average income, population, human 
capital (measured by average years of schooling), export concentration, and formal 
institutions. Finally, Section 5 introduces an estimator of the level of income inequality 
expected for the exporters of 775 different products in the Standard Industrial Trade 
Classification at the four-digit level (SITC-4 Rev.2). We use this estimator to illustrate 
how changes in a country’s productive structure are associated with changes in income 
inequality. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. CONNECTING INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
Decades ago Simon Kuznets (1955) proposed an inverted-u-shaped relationship 
describing the connection between a country’s average level of income and its level of 
income inequality. Kuznets’ curve suggested that as an economy develops, market forces 
would first increase and then decrease income inequality. Yet, Kuznets’ curve has been 
difficult to verify. The inverted-u-shaped relationship predicted by Kuznets fails to hold if 
several Latin American countries are removed from the sample (Deininger & Squire, 
1998), and in recent decades, the upward side of Kuznets’ curve has vanished as 
inequality in many low-income countries has increased (Palma, 2011). Moreover, several 
East-Asian economies have grown from low to middle incomes while reducing income 
inequality (Stiglitz, 1996). Together, these findings undermine the empirical robustness of 
Kuznets’ curve, and reaffirm that GDP per capita is an insufficient measure of economic 
development in terms of explaining variations in income inequality (Kuznets, 1934; 
Kuznets, 1973; Leontieff, 1951; Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009).  
 
The empirical failure of Kuznets’ curve resonates with recent work arguing that inequality 
is not only dependent on a country’s rate or stage of growth, but also on its type of growth 
and institutions (Engerman & Sokoloff; 1997; Fields; 2002; Bourguignon, 2004; 
Ravallion, 2004; Sachs, 2005; Beinhocker, 2006; Collier 2007; Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi 
2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Hartmann, 2014). We should expect, then, that more 
nuanced measures of economic development (such as those focused on the sophistication 
of the products that a country exports) should provide information on the connection 
between economic development and income inequality that exceeds the limitations of 
aggregate output measures like GDP. 
 
Understanding the determinants of income inequality is not simple since income 
inequality depends on a variety of factors, from an economy’s factor endowments, 
geography, institutions and social capital, to its historical trajectories, changes in 
technology, and returns to capital (Engerman & Sokoloff; 1997; Gustafsson & Johansson, 
1999; Acemoglu, Aghion & Violante, 2001; Fields, 2002; Beinhocker, 2006; Collier 
2007; Davis, 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Brynjolfsson & Afee, 2012; Stiglitz, 
2013; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Autor, 2014, Hartmann, 2014). 
 
Measuring these factors directly is difficult, but we can create indirect measures of them 
by leveraging the fact that the presence of these factors is expressed in a country’s mix of 
products (Innis, 1970; Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, 
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2006; Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik, 2006; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 
2009; Felipe et al., 2012; Tacchella et al., 2012; Cristelli et al., 2013; Hausmann et al., 
2014; Hidalgo, 2015). For example, post-colonial economies specializing in a limited 
number of agricultural or mineral products, like sugar, gold, and coffee, tend to have more 
unequal distributions of political power, human capital, and wealth (Innis, 1970; 
Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), and hence, their productive 
structures provide us with indirect information about their geographies, human capital, 
and institutions. Conversely, sophisticated products, like medical imaging devices or 
electronic components, are typically produced in diversified economies with inclusive 
institutions and high levels of human capital. This means that the presence of complex 
industries in an economy, in addition to indicating the inclusiveness of that economy’s 
institutions, also reveals the knowledge and knowhow that is embodied in its population 
(Hidalgo, 2015).  
 
The idea that productive structures co-evolve with the inclusiveness of institutions is not 
new, and can be traced back to the work of scholars from the early twentieth century, like 
Harold Innis (1970), and to more recent scholars, including Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997), or Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Innis was a Canadian political economist who 
wrote extensively about how Canada’s early exports (mainly fur) helped determine 
Canada’s institutions (i.e. the Canadian relationships with Native Americans and with 
Europe). More recently, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012) have built an institutional theory of international differences in income based on 
the idea that colonial powers installed different institutions in their colonies. According to 
the theory, settlers installed extractive industries and institutions when they found 
unfavorable conditions, but created the cities that homed both, non-extractive activities 
and inclusive institutions, when they found favorable conditions that allowed them to 
migrate in mass.  
 
From a modeling perspective, we can understand the co-evolution between productive 
structures, institutions, and human capital, by assuming a model of heterogeneous firms in 
which firms survive only when they are able to adopt or discover the institutions and 
human capital that work best in the industry that they participate in. This model assumes 
that institutions are to an significant extent created at work and depend on the type of 
industry. This assumption is extremely likely, because on the one hand, people learn to 
interact and collaborate with others in work settings, and on the other, there are clearly 
marked differences in the institutions (or culture) of different sectors. For instance, the 
liberal institutions that are common in Silicon Valley’s tech sector might be ideal for 
industries that require workers to be creative problem solvers. These institutions, however, 
might be suboptimal in the context of a mining operation where following rules and 
respecting hierarchies can ensure the safety of workers and the coordination of the entire 
mining operation.  
 
Of course, there are often differences in the ways different countries produce the same 
product. For instance, the same industry might be more labor-intensive in one country and 
more capital intensive in another country. However, there are also significant differences 
in the particular skills, knowledge, factor endowments and institutions that are needed to 
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become globally competitive in a particular industry. For instance, the production of cocoa 
beans or coffee depends on the availability of natural resources, while the production of 
complex industries (like jet engines) depends on an extensive network of skilled workers. 
We do not know a priori whether differences among countries producing the same product 
(e.g. the production of cars in Spain and Japan), are larger or smaller than differences 
among the production of different products in the same country (the production of oranges 
and cars in Spain). Yet, the fact that we find a strong connection between productive 
structures and income inequality suggests—but does not prove—that differences among 
the processes required to produce the same product in different countries, may be smaller 
than the differences among the processes required to produce different products in the 
same countries.  
 
Therefore we argue in this paper that countries exporting complex industries tend to be 
more inclusive and have lower levels of income inequality than countries that are 
exporting simpler products. Some countries may be able to achieve comparable high 
levels of average income based on natural resources, but those comparably high levels of 
income will rarely come with inclusive institutions when they are not the result of 
sophisticated industrial structures.  
 
A country’s productive structure can help explain variations in institutions and income 
inequality, however, only if there are significant differences in the productive structures of 
macro-economically similar countries. But how different are the productive structures of 
macro-economically similar countries? As an example consider Chile and Malaysia. In 
2012, Chile’s average income per capita and years of schooling ($21,044 at PPP in current 
2012 US$ and 9.8 mean years of schooling) was comparable to Malaysia’s income per 
capita and schooling ($22,314 and 9.5). Yet, their productive structures were practically 
orthogonal (see Figure 1), since Malaysia’s exports mostly involved machinery and 
electronics, while Chile’s exports mostly involved agriculture and mining. The Economic 
Complexity Index (ECI) captures these differences in productive structure. In 2012 
Malaysia ranked 24th in the ECI ranking while Chile ranked only 72nd (for the ECI 
rankings and further information about export structures see atlas.media.mit.edu). 
Moreover, these differences in the ECI ranking also point more accurately to differences 
in these countries’ level of income inequality. Chile’s inequality as measured through the 
Gini coefficient (GiniCHL=0.49) is significantly higher than that of Malaysia 
(GiniMYS=0.39), illustrating the correlation between income inequality and productive 
structures (see also Figure 2). The remainder of the paper is dedicated to statistically 
testing this relationship for a large set of countries and years, as well as creating a product 
level index of income inequality that allows for the visualization of the co-evolution 
between the structural transformation and income inequality for all countries in our 
dataset. 
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Figure 1. Export structure of Chile (A) and Malaysia (B) in 2012. 
Source: atlas.media.mit.edu 
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS  
 
We use data from the Economic Complexity Index (ECI), as well as international trade 
data, from MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity (atlas.media.mit.edu) (Simoes & 
Hidalgo 2011). The trade data set combines exports data from 1962 to 2000, compiled by 
Feenstra et al. (2005), and data from the U.N. Comtrade for the period between 2001 and 
2012. 
 
The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) measures the sophistication of a country’s 
productive structure by combining information on the diversity of a country (the number 
of products it exports), and the ubiquity of its products (the number of countries that 
export that product) (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). The intuition behind ECI is that 
sophisticated economies are diverse and export products that, on average, have low 
ubiquity, because only a few diverse countries can make these sophisticated products. By 
the same token, less sophisticated economies are expected to produce a few ubiquitous 
products. ECI exploits this variation in the diversity of countries and the ubiquity of 
products to create a measure of a country’s productive structure that incorporates 
information about the sophistication of products.  
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ECI is calculated from exports data connecting countries to the products in which they 
have Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA) (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). The 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of a country c in a product p is:  
 
 
where Xcp is the total export of country c in product p. RCA is larger than 1 (indicating that 
a country has comparative advantage in a product), if a country's export of a product are 
larger than what would be expected from the size of the country's export economy and the 
product's global market. 
 
RCA are used to define a discrete matrix Mcp which is equal to 1 if country c has RCA in 
product p and 0 otherwise. 
Mcp= 1 if RCAcp≥1 
Mcp= 0 if RCAcp<1 
The matrix Mcp allows to define the diversity of a country and the ubiquity of a product, 
respectively, as the number of products that are exported by a country with comparative 
advantage, and the number of countries that export a product with comparative advantage. 
  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦	 = 	𝑘,- = 𝑀,//  𝑈𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦	 = 	𝑘/- = 𝑀,/,  
Next, a matrix can be defined that connects countries exporting similar products, weighted 
by the inverse of the ubiquity of a product (to discount common products), and normalized 
by the diversity of a country: 
 
Finally, the economic complexity index (ECI) is defined as 
 
where Kc is the eigenvector of associated with the second largest eigenvalue—the 
vector associated with the largest eigenvalue is a vector of ones (Hausmann et al., 2014; 
Caldarelli et al., 2012, Kemp-Benedict, 2014). 
 
Table 1 shows the top five and bottom five economies based on the ranking provided by 
ECI for the year 2012. 
 
 
RCAcp =
Xcp
Xcp 'p '∑
Xc ' pc '∑
Xc ' p 'c ' p '∑
!Mcc ' =
1
kc,0
McpMc ' p
kp,0p
∑
ECIc =
Kc − K
std K( )
!Mcc '
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Table 1. Top and bottom 5 countries in the Economic Complexity Ranking 2012 
    
Top 5 countries by economic complexity 
    
ECI Rank Country GDP per capita (cons 2005 US$) ECI 
1 Japan 36912 2.2288 
2 Switzerland 58557 1.9734 
3 Germany 39274 1.8396 
4 Sweden 45260 1.7089 
5 South Korea 23303 1.6999 
    
    
Bottom 5 countries by economic complexity 
    
ECI Rank ID GDP per capita (cons 2005 US$) ECI 
120 Nigeria 1034 -1.6289 
121 Turkmenistan 3270 -1.7245 
122 Guinea 303 -1.7804 
123 Angola 2426 -2.2458 
124 Libya 7078 -3.1767 
 
Source: atlas.media.mit.edu, World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
 
Our income inequality data comes from the Gini coefficient estimates by Galbraith et al., 
2014) (GINI EHII dataset) and the GINI ALL dataset from Milanovic (2013). We mainly 
use the GINI EHII dataset because it is more comprehensive than other datasets (such as 
the GINI ALL dataset from Milanovic (2013) for the period between 1963 and 1989. The 
GINI EHII dataset contains inequality data for more than 60 countries starting in 1970, 
whereas the GINI ALL dataset contains data for less than 40 countries for periods between 
1963 and 1989. Moreover the GINI ALL and is biased towards countries with high levels 
of GDP per capita and economic complexity (see figure A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Additionally we use data on a country’s GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) in constant 2005 US$, average years of schooling, and population, from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Data on institutional variables: corruption control, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and voice and 
accountability, come from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org). 
 
It must be noted that we consider only countries with a population larger than 1.5 million 
and total exports of over 1 billion dollars, thus removing small national economies that are 
comparable to medium-size cities. The resulting dataset includes 91% of the total world 
population and 84% of the total world trade between 1963 and 2008. Because of the 
sparseness of several variables, especially the Gini data, we use average values for the 
time periods 1963-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2008. We note that 
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Gini values change relatively slow, so these averages are close to the Gini values expected 
for each year within a decade. Summary statistics for all variables and each time period 
can be found in the Appendix (Table A1). 
 
4 THE STATISTICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
In this section we use bivariate and multivariate statistics to explore the connection 
between economic complexity and income inequality and to test its robustness to a 
number of controls. 
 
4a. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS:  COMPARING THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF 
DIFFERENT MEASURES OF PRODUCTIVE STRUCTURES 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the bivariate relationship between Economic Complexity and Income 
Inequality in different decades, and compares the bivariate relationship between ECI-GINI 
with the bivariate relationship between ECI and GDP per capita (at Purchasing Power 
Parity, in constant 2005 US$) for 79 countries between 2000 and 2008. Both economic 
complexity and GDP per capita show a negative relationship with income inequality 
(Figure 2-A and 2-B). However, the negative relationship between economic complexity 
and income inequality (R2=0.58, p-value=~10-16) is stronger than the relationship between 
income inequality and GDP per capita (R2=0.36, p-value= ~10-10), and the difference in R2 
between these two bivariate regressions is statistically significant. To test for the 
significance of the difference in R2 we used the Clarke-Test for non-nested models. Just as 
the F-test is the standard method to select among nested models, the Clarke-test is the 
basic statistical model used to test the significance of differences in R2 for non-nested 
models (models where the independent variables are not perfect subsets of each other). In 
our case, the Clarke-Test prefers the ECI-GINI model over the GDP per capita-GINI 
model with a p-value=4.3x10-7 (also see Table A2 in the Appendix). Figures 2-C to 2-F, 
furthermore, show that the negative bivariate relationship between income inequality and 
economic complexity is stable across all considered decades. In all decades, we find a 
negative and significant relationship between economic complexity and income 
inequality.  
 
  11 
 
Figure 2. Bivariate relationships between economic complexity, income, and income inequality. 
Notes: All figures show that R2 and all p-values are less than 10-10. (A) ECI versus GINI EHII in 2000-2008. 
(B) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) versus GINI EHII. (C) ECI versus GINI EHII 
in 1963-1969, (D) 1970-1979, (E) 1980-1989 and (F) 1990-1999. 
 
Next we compare the bivariate relationships between different measures of productive 
structures and income inequality in the period 2000-2008 (Figure 3). The matrix diagonal 
of Figure 3 illustrates the histograms of each variable, the upper triangle of the matrix 
shows the correlation coefficients between each pair of variables, and the lower triangle 
shows the corresponding scatterplots with a smoothed conditional mean line. ECI has 
strong and significant correlations with all other measures of productive structure, while 
ECI has a higher correlation with the income inequality measures GINI EHII and GINI 
ALL than GDP and all other measures of productive structures. Table A2 and Table A3 in 
the Appendix also show the result of the Clarke tests comparing the predictive power of 
ECI for income inequality with other measures of productive structures for time periods. 
In the case of GINI EHII data, ECI is significantly preferred as predictor variable in 15 out 
of 16 model comparisons, whereas only in one model comparison neither model is 
significantly preferred. In case of the GINI ALL data, ECI is significantly preferred in 13 
out of 16 model comparisons, while in three cases neither model is preferred. There is no 
case which income per capita or measures of productive structures are significantly 
preferred as predictor variable for income inequality in comparison to ECI.  
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Figure 3. Correlations between different economic diversity measures and income inequality in 2000-2008. 
HHI refers to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and is a commonly used concentration measure; the 
Economic Complexity Index (ECI), the Fitness Index and Shannon Entropy are used to measure the 
diversity and sophistication of a country’s exports. 
 
Next, we proceed to cross-sectional and panel regressions to see if there is a significant 
correlation between economic complexity and inequality when controlling for other 
factors of inequality like human capital or institutions. Afterwards, we present a new 
measure that allows us to estimate the level of inequality related to different types of 
products. This measure, in combination with the network of related products (Hidalgo et 
al., 2007), shows how the productive structure constrains a country’s income inequality 
and opportunities for inclusive economic development. 
 
 
4b. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
We start our analysis with a pooled regression for the period from 1996 to 2008, and then 
we explore the changes in Ginis, between 1960s and 2000s, using a panel regression for 
each decade that includes country fixed effects. Because of the sparseness of the Gini 
datasets and slow temporal changes in Ginis, we use average values for each panel. We 
use the periods 1996-2001 and 2002-2008 for cross-section regressions and 1963-1969, 
1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2008 for the fixed effects panel regression. 
Due to the sparseness of the institutional variables, we only include them in the cross-
section regressions. 
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POOLED REGRESSION 
 
Table 2 shows a pooled cross-sectional regression for the periods of time between 1996-
2001 and 2002-2008. Columns 1 to 6 illustrate a sequence of nested models that regress 
income inequality against economic complexity, GDP per capita at Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) and its square (a.k.a. Kuznets’ Curve), average years of schooling, 
population and the institutional factors: corruption control, government effectiveness, 
political stability, voice and accountability, and regulatory quality. 
 
In every model, the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) is a negative and significant 
predictor of income inequality. Education (as measured by average years of schooling) 
and log GDP squared also show a negative and significant correlation with inequality; log 
GDP a positive and significant correlation. Notably, when we control for economic 
complexity, then the rising part of the Kuznets curve is even more pronounced than 
without it. Also the role of education in terms of years of schooling becomes less 
important. Together, all variables explain 69.3% of the variance in income inequality 
among countries (Table 2, Column 1), but ECI is the most significant variable in the 
regression analysis, and it is also the variable that explains the largest percentage of the 
variance in income inequality after the effects of all other variables have been taken into 
account. The semi-partial correlation of ECI (the difference in R2 between the full model 
and one in which only ECI was removed) is 8.1%, meaning that 8.1% of the variance in 
income inequality—which is not accounted for by institutional and macroeconomic 
variables—is explained by ECI (Table 2). Conversely the semi-partial correlations of all 
institutional variables is less than 0.1%, while that of income, population, and education, 
are all individually less than 2%. This means that these variables capture information 
about inequality that is already largely captured by ECI. Furthermore, ECI contains 
additional information about inequality that cannot be explained by these other variables 
alone. 
Table 2. Pooled OLS regression models 
 
Dependent variable: Gini 
  
  
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
 
ECI -0.040***  -0.037*** -0.046*** -0.033*** -0.044*** 
 (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
ln(GDP PPP pc) 0.067** 0.059*  0.060** 0.056* 0.075*** 
 (0.028) (0.032)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) 
ln(GDP PPP pc)2 -0.004** -0.004*  -0.003* -0.003* -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Schooling -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.004**  -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln Population 0.007** 0.0001 0.005* 0.008***  0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) 
Rule of law -0.013 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013  
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
Corruption Control 0.011 0.027* 0.009 0.016 0.007  
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)  
Government Effectiveness 0.002 -0.022 0.003 0.006 0.010  
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
Political Stability -0.010 -0.017** -0.009 -0.009 -0.017***  
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
Regulatory Quality -0.006 -0.012 -0.0002 -0.010 -0.012  
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  
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Voice and accountability 0.001 0.006 0.001 -0.004 0.003  
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Constant 0.083 0.286** 0.391*** 0.068 0.244** 0.016 
 (0.130) (0.141) (0.050) (0.134) (0.114) (0.121) 
 
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 
R2 0.717 0.639 0.701 0.699 0.704 0.704 
Adjusted R2 0.693 0.612 0.681 0.676 0.681 0.693 
Residual Std. Error 0.035 (df = 130) 
0.039 (df 
= 131) 
0.035 (df 
= 132) 
0.035 (df 
= 131) 
0.035 (df 
= 131) 
0.035 (df 
= 136) 
F-Statistic 
29.916*** 
(df = 11; 
130) 
23.208*** 
(df = 10; 
131) 
34.413*** 
(df = 9; 
132) 
30.458*** 
(df = 10; 
131) 
31.165*** 
(df = 10; 
131) 
64.656*** 
(df = 5; 
136) 
 
  
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
These pooled OLS regression models regress income inequality against economic complexity, a country’s 
average level of income and its square, population, human capital and the institutional variables: rule of law, 
corruption control, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and 
accountability. Column I includes all variables. Columns II-VI exclude blocks of variables to explore the 
contribution of each group of variables to the full model. The sharpest drop in R2 (from 0.693 to 0.612) is 
observed when ECI is removed from the regression. The table pools data from two panels, one from 1996-
2001 and another one from 2002-2008. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors (SEM). 
 
In the Tables A4-A8 of the Appendix we also test these results within each decade as well 
as using alternative Gini data sets (Milanovic, 2013; Galbraith et al., 2014) and alternative 
measures of economic diversity, concentration, and fitness (Hirschman, 1945; Herfindahl, 
1950; Imbs & Wacziarg, 2003; Teece et al., 1994; Frenken, Oort & Verburg, 2007; 
Saviotti & Frenken, 2008; Boschma & Iammarino, 2009; Tacchella et al., 2012; Cristelli, 
Tacchella & Pietronero, 2015). We find that our results are robust to these changes in 
datasets, methods, and classifications. 
 
 
TEMPORAL CHANGES 
 
Next, we explore whether changes in a country’s level of economic complexity are 
associated with changes in income inequality by using a country-fixed-effect panel 
regression with decade panels from 1963 to 2008. Unlike cross-sectional results, which 
make use of variations in inequality between countries, fixed-effect panel regressions 
exploit temporal variations within a country. These variations are small for both income 
inequality and economic complexity, and thus we should not expect large effects. Yet, 
despite the low levels of temporal variation in the data, the fixed-effect panel regression 
still reveals a negative and significant association between a country’s change in economic 
complexity and in its Gini coefficient (Table 3), meaning countries that experienced an 
increase in economic complexity tended to experience a decrease in income inequality. In 
fact, we find that an increase in one standard deviation in economic complexity is 
associated with a reduction in Gini of 0.03. This is equivalent to three extra years of 
schooling. This association between changes in economic complexity and income 
inequality is robust to the inclusion of measures of income and human capital. The 
institutional variables are not included since that data is only available for only one of the 
five panels (the most recent one).  
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Table 3. Fixed-effects panel regression 
 
 Dependent variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
ECI -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.026***  -0.030*** -0.029*** 
 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007  -0.007 -0.007 
ln(GDP PPP pc)  -0.038 -0.042 -0.017 -0.032  -0.053* 
  -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.03  -0.03 
ln(GDP PPPpc)2  0.003* 0.002 -0.00003 0.0005  0.004** 
  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 
Schooling   0.010*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.010***  
   -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002  
Ln Population    -0.024** -0.016 -0.022** 0.014* 
    -0.011 -0.011 -0.01 -0.008 
Observations 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
R2 0.077 0.123 0.198 0.213 0.165 0.196 0.134 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.087 0.139 0.149 0.116 0.138 0.094 
F-Statistic 20.13*** 
(df = 1; 
240) 
11.14*** 
(df = 3; 
238) 
14.63*** 
(df = 4; 
237) 
12.80*** 
(df = 5; 
236) 
11.74*** 
(df = 4; 
237) 
19.36*** 
(df = 3; 
238) 
9.15*** (df 
= 4; 237) 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
These seven fixed-effects panel regression models explore whether changes in a country’s level of economic 
complexity are associated with changes in income inequality (column I), also controlling for the effects that 
other socioeconomic factors like income (column II), human capital (column III) and population (column 
IV) have on income inequality. Columns V-VII control the variance explained by the model when ECI, 
income, or schooling, are excluded from the analysis. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors (SEM). 
 
This shows that the mix of products that a country exports is a significant predictor of 
income inequality in both cross-sectional and panel regressions, even when controlling for 
other aggregated socioeconomic variables, like GDP, education or population. Naturally, 
future research could address variations within educational achievements or variables like 
within-countries differences in access to infrastructure in more detail (Acemoglu & Dell, 
2010).  
 
While in this section we controlled the significant general trends of the relationship 
between economic complexity and income inequality, the next section explores the 
inequality related to 775 particular product categories and visualizes the importance of the 
network structure of production—or product space— for the subsequent diversification of 
countries into more inclusive industries or less inclusive industries. 
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5. THE PRODUCT SPACE AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
This section first estimates the expected inequality related to different types of products 
and then uses this information to visualize the country unique structural constraints on 
economic development and income inequality. 
 
DECOMPOSING INEQUALITY AT THE PRODUCT LEVEL 
 
We decompose the relationship between economic complexity and income inequality into 
individual economic sectors by creating a product level estimator of the income inequality 
that is expected for the countries exporting a given product. We call this product level 
indicator the Product Gini Index (PGI). The PGI is closely related to previous measures on 
the sophistication of exports—i.e. the export sophistication measure of Lall, Weiss & 
Zhang 
 (2006), the PRODY of Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik (2006) and the Product Complexity 
Index of Hausmann and Hidalgo (2009)—showing that the type of products a country 
exports determines its level of economic development (Rodrik, 2006; Hausmann, Hwang 
& Rodrik, 2006; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). However, instead of 
relating products to income of the countries exporting these products, the PGI explores the 
association of products with different levels of income inequality. 
 
Decomposing income inequality at the product level can be understood in the context of 
the co-evolution between productive structures, education, and institutions, as discussed in 
the introduction. To decompose income inequality at the product level we define the 
Product Gini Index (PGI) as the average level of income inequality of a product’s 
exporters, weighted by the importance of each product in a country’s export basket. 
Formally, we define the PGI (Product Gini Index) for a product p as:  
                                   (1) 
where Ginic is the Gini coefficient of country c, Mcp is 1 if country c exports product p 
with revealed comparative advantage and 0 otherwise, scp is the share of country c’s 
exports represented by product p. Np is a normalizing factor that ensures PGIs are the 
weighted average of the Ginis. Np and scp are calculated as: 
 
 
where, 
 
where Xcp is the total export of product p by country c.  
 
We estimate PGIs using an average of Ginis for each product, instead of using a 
regression with product dummies, because the number of products in our data is much 
larger than the number of countries (e.g. 775 vs. 92 in 1995-2008), and hence, a regression 
would be over-specified.  
PGIp =
1
Np
McpscpGinic
c
∑
Np = Mcpscp
c
∑
scp = Xcp Xcp 'p '∑
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Figure 4A illustrates the construction of the PGI and Figure 4B shows the top 3, bottom 3 
and median 3 products according to the ranking of PGI values between 1995 and 2008 
(for all products see Table A12 in the Appendix). The products associated with the highest 
levels of income inequality (high PGI) mainly consist of commodities, such as Cocoa 
Beans, Inedible Flours of Meat and Fish, and Animal Hair. Low PGI products, on the 
other hand, include more sophisticated forms of machinery and manufacturing products, 
such as Paper Making Machine Parts, Textile Machinery, and Road Rollers. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Product Gini Index (PGI). 
 
Notes: (A). The product Gini index (PGI) is a weighted average of the Gini coefficients of the countries that 
export a product. The Gini coefficients of five copper exporters is shown in red. In blue, we show the Gini 
coefficients of exporters of paper making machine parts. (B). Top three, middle three, and bottom three 
products by PGI values. The PGI value is indicated with a black diamond. The Gini values of the five 
countries that contribute the most to each of these PGI are shown using diamonds. All values are measured 
using data from 1995-2008. 
 
Further information and descriptive statistics about the Product Ginis can also be found in 
the Tables A9-A11 and Figure A2 of the Appendix. It must be noted that products with a 
high level of economic complexity—measured by the product complexity index (Hidalgo 
& Hausmann, 2009; Felipe et al., 2012; Hausmann et al. 2014)—tend to also have lower 
PGI values (Figure A2 of the Appendix). This means that complex products—such 
machine parts or electronic equipment for industrial chains or I-Phones, robots or 3D 
printing devices—tend to be produced in more equalitarian countries than simpler and 
resource-exploiting products like cocoa beans or copper. It is common sense that complex 
products require a larger network of skilled workers, related industries and inclusive 
institutions making the economic competitiveness of these products possible, than simpler 
industrial products and resource exploiting activities whose competitiveness is mainly 
based on resource richness, low labor costs, routinized activities and economies of scale. 
A related observation, which is important but beyond the scope of this paper is that these 
simpler products also tend to be located at the beginning or the end of global production 
chains—they are either extractive or assembly activities. 
  18 
 
Naturally, the association between product complexity and income inequality also implies 
the need to understand the systemic distribution of inequality across the network of related 
products—or global product space (Hidalgo et al., 2007), and how productive 
transformations of the productive matrix are associated with changes in income inequality. 
 
 
THE PRODUCT SPACE AND THE EVOLUTION OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
 
In this section, we use PGIs in combination with the product space—the network 
connecting products that are likely to be co-exported—to show how changes in a 
country’s productive structure are connected to changes in a country’s level of income 
inequality.  
 
Figure 5A assigns colors for each product, using PGIs between 1995 and 2008. Products 
associated with low levels of inequality (low PGIs) are located in the center of the product 
space, where the more sophisticated products are located. On the other hand, high PGI 
products tend to be located in the periphery of the product space, where less sophisticated 
products are located (6). 
 
We can also use the product space to study the constraints on industrial diversification and 
the evolution of income inequality implied by a country’s productive structure. The 
product space captures the notion that countries, cities, and regions, are significantly more 
likely to diversify towards products that are similar (i.e. connected in the product space) to 
the products that they currently export (Frenken, Oort & Verburg, 2007; Saviotti & 
Frenken, 2008; Boschma & Iammarino, 2009; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 
2009; Neffke, Henning & Boschma, 2011; Hausmann et al., 2014) 
 
Figure 5B-G compares the evolution of the productive structure of Malaysia (5B-C), 
Norway (5D-E), and Chile (5F-G). Malaysia’s economy evolved from high PGI products 
in 1963-1969—e.g. natural rubber and sawlogs—to low PGI products in 2000-2008—e.g. 
electronic microcircuits and computer parts. Norway, on the other hand, moved in the 
opposite direction, increasing its dependency on a high PGI product—crude petroleum—
and saw an increase in income inequality. Finally, Chile developed in a more constrained 
way, diversifying into products with a relatively high PGI—frozen fish, fresh fish, and 
wine. More generally, these examples illustrate how the productive structure of a country 
constrains the evolution of its income inequality. 
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Figure 5. The product space and income inequality. (A) In this visualization of the product space nodes are 
colored according to a product’s PGI as measured between 1995-2008. Node sizes are proportional to world 
trade between 2000 and 2008. The networks are based on a proximity matrix representing 775 SITC-4 
product classes exported between 1963-2008. The link strength (proximity) is based on the conditional 
probability that the products are co-exported. (B) Malaysia’s export portfolio between 1963-1969. In this 
  20 
figure and the subsequent ones node sizes indicate the share of a product in a country’s export basket. Only 
products with RCA greater than 1 are presented. (C) Malaysia’s export portfolio between 2000-2008. (D) 
Norway’s exports between 1963-1969 and (E) between 2000-2008. (F) Chile’s exports between 1963-1969 
and (G) between 2000-2008. 
 
 
FACILITATING THE INTERACTIVE STUDY OF COUNTRIES’ PATHS OF 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
 
Data on all countries can be explored in an interactive web-tool we designed for this 
paper. The web-tool is available at MIT’s observatory of economic complexity 
(atlas.media.mit.edu). The purpose of the interactive, visualization tool is to enable 
discussions among academicians, policy-makers and practitioners about inclusive growth 
opportunities that takes into account each country’s unique productive structure, particular 
opportunities for inclusive growth, and historical-structural-developments. The interactive 
online tool allows the user to explore a map of 774 products between the years 1963 and 
2008.  
 
DISCUSSION / CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Our results illustrate that the ability of an economy to both generate and distribute income 
is strongly correlated with the mix of products a country is able to produce and export.  
 
Taking economic complexity and productive space dynamics into account allows us to 
reveal structural linkages between economic development and income inequality which 
aggregated variables like the average years of schooling or income per capita alone are 
incapable of revealing. Our empirical results document a strong and robust correlation 
between the economic complexity index and income inequality. Using multivariate 
regression, we confirmed that this relationship is robust to controlling for measures of 
income, education, and institutions, and that this relationship has remained strong over the 
last fifty years. Moreover, we showed that increases in economic complexity tend to be 
accompanied by decreases in income inequality.  
 
Our findings do not mean that productive structures solely determine a country’s level of 
income inequality. On the contrary, a more likely explanation of the association between a 
country’s productive structure and income inequality is that, as we argued in the 
introduction, productive structures represent a high-resolution expression of a number of 
factors, from institutions to education, that co-evolve with a country’s mix of exported 
products and with the inclusiveness of its economy. Still, because of this co-evolution, our 
findings emphasize the economic importance of productive structures, since we have 
shown that these are not only associated with income and economic growth (Hidalgo et 
al., 2007; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014), but also with how income 
is distributed. 
 
Moreover, we advance methods that enable a more fine-grained perspective on the 
relationship between productive structures and income inequality. The method is based on 
introducing the Product Gini Index or PGI, which estimates the expected level of 
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inequality for the countries exporting a given product. Overlaying PGI values on the 
network of related products allows us to create maps that can be used to anticipate how 
changes in a country’s productive structure could affect its level of income inequality. 
These maps provide means for researchers and policy-makers to explore and compare the 
co-evolution of productive structures, institutions and income inequality for hundreds of 
economies. 
 
This paper and the related online tool show that a country’s productive structure 
conditions its path of economic development and its abilities to generate and distribute 
income. This also implies that social and industrial policies may need to complement each 
other to achieve sustained inequality reduction and economic development (Stiglitz, 1996; 
Ranis, Steward & Ramirez, 2000; Amsden, 2010; Hartmann, 2014). While it is important 
for economic development and inequality reduction to improve school education and 
health services, it is also important to create advanced products and jobs that demand 
specialized education and inclusive institutions. 
 
Of course, much more theoretical work needs to be done on the complex relationships 
between economic complexity, institutions and income inequality. For example, there is a 
need for more research on the importance of sector-wide institutions versus national 
institutions in different types of products. Moreover, the role of unions and different types 
of knowledge—e.g. tacit or codified knowledge— in the relationship between a country’s 
productive matrix and its level of income inequality needs to be more thoroughly 
explored. Finally, the association between industrialization and gender equality requires 
further research.  
 
More in-depth case studies are also required, for example in countries like Mexico and 
Australia. Mexico shows both a high level of income inequality and a high ECI. This 
might be due to the impact of US production facilities and a slightly inflated ECI value, a 
fact that is partly expressed in the lack of diversity of Mexico’s export destinations. 
Conversely, Australia has partly succeeded in establishing inclusive institutions with 
relatively low levels of income inequality, despite having an export structure focused on 
natural resource extraction. Yet, there may be other activities that are not captured in trade 
data—such as the export of mining services and operations—that may help partly explain 
the anomaly. In other words, Australia might be a case where the measure of complexity 
based on exports underestimates the country’s real complexity. 
 
We must also note that our results are limited to the time period between 1963 to 2008. 
Yet, significant root causes of the present institutions, world production system, and 
distribution of income can be traced back to the Commercial Revolution and colonization 
in the 15th -18th century, as well as the Industrial Revolution that has started in the 18th 
century and has subsequently spread across the world. Certainly not all segments of the 
population have always benefitted from an increase in economic complexity, since many 
individuals suffered—or continue to suffer—from unemployment, slavery, or exploitative 
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working conditions. Nonetheless, the social institutions necessary to allow countries to use 
new technologies, sustain creative destruction processes, and achieve high levels of 
economic complexity over the middle to long-run, have tended to include larger segments 
of the population back again into the economic development processes, at least in the 
industrially most advanced economies (Perez, 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  
 
Despite the limitations, we showed that applying methods from economic complexity and 
network science allows us to capture significant information about countries’ path of 
economic development that goes beyond aggregated input or output factors like GDP or 
years of schooling. The development pioneers highlighted the role of productive structures 
and structural transformations in economic development. Here we have introduced 
methods that are capable of exploring how heterogeneous productive structures of 
countries condition their ability to generate and distribute income in more detail. 
Moreover, we can use these methods to further explore the association between economic 
complexity and the evolution of institutions. 
 
In sum, our analysis strongly suggests that countries exporting more complex products 
tend to have significantly lower levels of income inequality than countries exporting 
simple products.  
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APPENDIX 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
Figure A1. Comparison between GINI EHII dataset (solid line) and GINI ALL dataset (dashed line).  
Notes: (A) Shows the total number of countries in each dataset, by year. (B) Shows average ECI of countries in each 
dataset, by year. 
 
Table A1. Descriptive summary statistics 
 
Variable Year Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
ECI 1963-1969 102 0.01 1.11 -2.67 2.16 
ECI 1970-1979 108 -0.03 1.03 -2.51 1.90 
ECI 1980-1989 103 0.00 1.07 -2.17 2.18 
ECI 1990-1999 125 0.02 1.02 -1.79 2.31 
ECI 2000-2008 128 0.00 0.98 -1.75 2.54 
ECI All decades 566 0.00 1.03 -2.67 2.54 
GINI EHII 1963-1969 85 42.67 7.35 22.32 54.59 
GINI EHII 1970-1979 108 41.65 7.66 21.22 52.49 
GINI EHII 1980-1989 121 41.48 7.59 20.93 53.09 
GINI EHII 1990-1999 125 43.49 6.94 28.10 58.25 
GINI EHII 2000-2008 103 43.69 6.40 29.62 55.02 
GINI EHII All decades 542 42.59 7.24 20.93 58.25 
GINI All 1963-1969 44 41.46 10.06 20.88 62.00 
GINI All 1970-1979 62 40.30 9.05 21.80 61.25 
GINI All 1980-1989 99 36.31 11.24 18.60 62.90 
GINI All 1990-1999 136 40.52 10.23 20.49 74.30 
GINI All 2000-2008 148 40.05 9.55 23.98 72.95 
GINI All All decades 489 39.58 10.19 18.60 74.30 
GDP PPP05 pc 1963-1969 71 4706.9 5984.5 113.0 21871.4 
GDP PPP05 pc 1970-1979 76 6423.5 7881.9 168.8 29260.0 
GDP PPP05 pc 1980-1989 92 8236.6 11578.5 150.1 59411.1 
GDP PPP05 pc 1990-1999 115 8603.9 12061.4 128.2 51800.0 
GDP PPP05 pc 2000-2008 123 11030.6 14669.9 157.6 64311.1 
GDP PPP05 pc All decades 477 8231.4 11624.0 113.0 64311.1 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc) 1963-1969 71 7.64 1.34 4.73 9.99 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc) 1970-1979 76 7.93 1.39 5.13 10.28 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc) 1980-1989 92 7.97 1.56 5.01 10.99 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc) 1990-1999 115 8.04 1.52 4.85 10.86 
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Variable Year Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc) 2000-2008 123 8.33 1.51 5.06 11.07 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc) All decades 477 8.02 1.49 4.73 11.07 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc)2 1963-1969 71 60.08 20.83 22.35 99.86 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc)2 1970-1979 76 64.76 22.20 26.30 105.76 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc)2 1980-1989 92 65.94 25.15 25.11 120.83 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc)2 1990-1999 115 66.86 24.88 23.56 117.83 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc)2 2000-2008 123 71.68 25.35 25.60 122.58 
ln(GDP PPP05 pc)2 All decades 477 66.58 24.27 22.35 122.58 
Years of schooling 1963-1969 81 3.63 2.56 0.44 10.17 
Years of schooling 1970-1979 85 4.16 2.72 0.64 11.16 
Years of schooling 1980-1989 86 4.85 2.82 0.85 11.80 
Years of schooling 1990-1999 102 6.35 2.86 0.66 12.26 
Years of schooling 2000-2008 105 7.32 2.84 0.88 12.92 
Years of schooling All decades 459 5.41 3.09 0.44 12.92 
Population (million) 1963-1969 93 67.0 361.9 1.1 3401.4 
Population (million) 1970-1979 96 77.9 422.6 1.0 4027.0 
Population (million) 1980-1989 101 87.2 468.1 1.0 4560.0 
Population (million) 1990-1999 119 44.8 142.0 1.1 1196.0 
Population (million) 2000-2008 125 48.2 155.1 1.0 1294.4 
Corruption control 1990-1999 110 0.08 1.06 -1.28 2.40 
Corruption control 2000-2008 116 0.08 1.03 -1.48 2.48 
Corruption control All decades 226 0.08 1.04 -1.48 2.48 
Government effectiveness 1990-1999 110 0.13 0.97 -1.25 2.12 
Government effectiveness 2000-2008 116 0.15 0.97 -1.51 2.18 
Government effectiveness All decades 226 0.14 0.97 -1.51 2.18 
Political stability 1990-1999 110 -0.05 0.90 -2.38 1.51 
Political stability 2000-2008 116 -0.06 0.89 -2.08 1.58 
Political stability All decades 226 -0.05 0.89 -2.38 1.58 
Regulatory quality 1990-1999 110 0.14 0.95 -2.04 2.21 
Regulatory quality 2000-2008 116 0.15 0.95 -2.16 1.89 
Regulatory quality All decades 226 0.15 0.95 -2.16 2.21 
Rule of law 1990-1999 110 0.01 1.00 -1.67 1.93 
Rule of law 2000-2008 116 0.03 0.98 -1.53 1.93 
Rule of law All decades 226 0.02 0.99 -1.67 1.93 
Voice and accountability 1990-1999 110 0.02 0.97 -1.95 1.67 
Voice and accountability 2000-2008 116 0.00 1.00 -2.13 1.63 
Voice and accountability All decades 226 0.01 0.98 -2.13 1.67 
Fitness Index 1963-1969 102 0.99 2.59 0.00 15.5 
Fitness Index 1970-1979 108 0.94 2.34 0.00 10.1 
Fitness Index 1980-1989 103 1.00 4.54 0.00 45.6 
Fitness Index 1990-1999 125 1.00 1.40 0.00 7.29 
Fitness Index 2000-2008 128 1.00 1.21 0.00 5.81 
Fitness Index All decades 566 0.99 2.60 0.00 45.6 
Shannon Entropy 1963-1969 102 2.76 1.26 0.04 5.26 
Shannon Entropy 1970-1979 108 2.91 1.38 0.15 5.25 
Shannon Entropy 1980-1989 103 3.22 1.50 0.33 5.65 
Shannon Entropy 1990-1999 125 3.60 1.39 0.47 5.57 
Shannon Entropy 2000-2008 128 3.50 1.39 0.27 5.51 
Shannon Entropy All decades 566 3.23 1.42 0.04 5.65 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 1963-1969 102 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.99 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 1970-1979 108 0.23 0.26 0.01 0.96 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 1980-1989 103 0.21 0.24 0.01 0.91 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 1990-1999 125 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.83 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 2000-2008 128 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.91 
Herfindahl-Hirschman All decades 566 0.19 0.23 0.01 0.99 
       
Notes: Descriptive summary statistics for all macro indicators and all decades intervals used in the paper and 
in the robustness checks presented in the SM.The time period, number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum are shown. 
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Table A2. Clarke test for Gini EHII 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Year Clarke Test-Stat 
ECI  Fitness Index  Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p < 2e-16) 302 (81%) 
ECI  Fitness Index 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 9.1e-05) 62 (71%) 
ECI  Fitness Index 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 2.5e-05) 67 (72%) 
ECI  Fitness Index 1980-1989 Model 1 is preferred (p = 1.0e-07) 59 (81%) 
ECI  Entropy Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p < 2e-16) 287 (77%) 
ECI  Entropy 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 4.3e-06) 65 (75%) 
ECI  Entropy 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 2.5e-05) 67 (72%) 
ECI  Entropy 1980-1989 Model 1 is preferred (p = 0.00037) 52 (71%) 
ECI  HHI Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p < 2e-16) 296 (80%) 
ECI  HHI 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 4.3e-06) 65 (75%) 
ECI  HHI 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 4.4e-10) 76 (82%) 
ECI  HHI 1980-1989 Model 1 is preferred (p = 4.1e-07) 58 (79%) 
ECI  Log GDP Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p = 2.8e-15) 261 (70%) 
ECI  Log GDP 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 4.3e-07) 67 (77%) 
ECI  Log GDP 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 3.5e-07) 71 (76%) 
ECI  Log GDP 1980-1989 Neither model is significantly preferred (p = 0.82) 38 (52%) 
 
Notes: Clarke test compares Model 1 (ECI) with different measures of productive structure (Model 2). The 
dependent variable is GINI EHII. 
 
Table A3. Clarke test for Gini All 
 
Model 1 Model 2  Year Clarke Test-Stat 
ECI  Fitness Index Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p = 8.4e-14) 248 (70%) 
ECI  Fitness Index 2000-2008 Neither model is significantly preferred (p = 1) 52 (50%) 
ECI  Fitness Index 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 0.0039) 66 (65%) 
ECI  Fitness Index 1980-1989 Model 1 is preferred (p = 2.8e-06) 52 (79%) 
ECI  Entropy Pooled Neither model is significantly preferred (p = 0.1) 194 (54%) 
ECI  Entropy 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 0.019) 65 (62%) 
ECI  Entropy 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 0.0039) 66 (65%) 
ECI  Entropy 1980-1989 Neither model is significantly preferred (p = 0.18) 39 (59%) 
ECI  HHI Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p = 7.8e-10) 236 (66%) 
ECI  HHI 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 0.00039) 71 (68%) 
ECI  HHI 1990-1999 Model 1 is preferred (p = 3.9e-05) 72 (71%) 
ECI  HHI 1980-1989 Model 1 is preferred (p = 1.0e-04) 49 (74%) 
ECI  Log GDP Pooled Model 1 is preferred (p = 4.4e-13) 246 (69%) 
ECI  Log GDP 2000-2008 Model 1 is preferred (p = 0.00082) 70 (67%) 
 
Notes: Clarke test compares Model 1 (ECI) with different measures of productive structure (Model 2). The 
dependent variable is GINI ALL. 
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ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR DIFFERENT INEQUALITY MEASURES 
 
We find that ECI continues to be a negative and significant predictor of income inequality 
when the GINI ALL dataset is used instead of GINI EHII dataset (see Table A4). 
However, log GDP gains in significance as an inequality predictor. As was previously 
discussed, the GINI ALL dataset is strongly biased towards countries with a complex 
economy (see Figure A1), therefore is not a surprise that ECI loses some of its predictive 
power, since there is not much variation in ECI between countries in the sample. 
 
Table A4. Cross-Section Regression Results 
 
 Dependent variable: GINI ALL 
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ECI -4.920***  -3.640*** -6.129*** -3.967*** -5.464*** 
 (1.166)  (1.213) (1.172) (1.091) (1.200) 
ln(GDP PPP pc) 28.753*** 27.002***  26.477*** 27.364*** 32.493*** 
 (4.978) (5.221)  (5.160) (4.994) (4.623) 
ln(GDP PPPpc)2 -1.648*** -1.625***  -1.580*** -1.572*** -1.776*** 
 (0.311) (0.328)  (0.324) (0.313) (0.269) 
Schooling -1.257*** -1.625*** -0.850**  -1.362*** -1.272*** 
 (0.325) (0.330) (0.340)  (0.325) (0.331) 
ln Population 1.028** 0.264 0.612 1.303***  0.832* 
 (0.477) (0.464) (0.522) (0.492)  (0.435) 
Rule of Law -10.587*** -10.759*** -12.962*** -12.343*** -10.030***  
 (2.509) (2.640) (2.715) (2.576) (2.525)  
Corruption Control 6.602*** 8.087*** 5.046* 8.575*** 5.882**  
 (2.472) (2.575) (2.664) (2.524) (2.477)  
Government 
Effectiveness -1.448 (3.100) 
-3.801 
(3.210) 
-1.657 
(3.332) 
-0.573 
(3.227) 
-0.212 
(3.082) 
 
  
Political Stability -1.262 -2.055* -1.435 -0.970 -2.392**  
 (1.122) (1.164) (1.237) (1.168) (1.003)  
Regulatory Quality 5.971*** 5.432** 9.519*** 5.152** 4.941**  
 (2.231) (2.345) (2.381) (2.319) (2.205)  
Voice and 
Accountability 3.229
** 
(1.324) 
3.644*** 
(1.390) 
3.260** 
(1.448) 
2.344* 
(1.361) 
3.240** 
(1.339) 
 
  
Constant -89.788*** -61.970*** 34.531*** -89.412*** -65.991*** -106.250*** 
 (22.344) (22.471) (9.433) (23.323) (19.651) (21.661) 
 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.554 0.503 0.448 0.511 0.540 0.449 
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.471 0.416 0.479 0.511 0.432 
Residual Std. Error 6.632  (df = 155) 
6.980  
(df = 156) 
7.332  
(df = 157) 
6.922  
(df = 156) 
6.709  
(df = 156) 
7.229  
(df = 161) 
F Statistic 17.490
*** 
(df = 11; 155) 
15.759*** 
(df = 10; 156) 
14.135*** 
(df = 9; 157) 
16.284*** 
(df = 10; 156) 
18.346*** 
(df = 10; 156) 
26.273*** 
(df = 5; 161) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Notes: Pooled OLS regression models for GINI ALL. The regression table explores the effects of economic 
complexity on income inequality in comparison with other the socioeconomic factors, such as a country’s 
average level of income, population, human capital and the institutional variables: corruption control, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability. Column I 
includes all variables. Columns II-VI exclude blocks of variables to explore the contribution of each group 
of variables to the full model. The table pools data from two panels, one from 1996-2001 and another one 
from 2002-2008. If not otherwise indicated, the numbers in parenthesis are standard errors (SEM). 
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Next, we control the robustness of cross-sectional results within each decade. Table A5 
shows that there is a negative and significant relationship between economic complexity 
and GINI EHII in all decades. Moreover, Table A6 presents the results of the same 
regression using GINI ALL as the dependent variable. In all decades, and in both tables, 
ECI results to be a negative and significant predictor on income inequality. The 
importance of GDP increases when using the GINI ALL dataset, but ECI continues to 
explain a significant percentage of the variance of income inequality.  
 
 
Table A5. Per decade cross-sections with GINI EHII 
 
 Dependent variable:GINI EHII 
  
  
 1963-69 1963-69 1970-79 1970-79 1980-89 1980-89 1990-99 1990-99 2000-08 2000-08 
 
ECI -2.465***  -1.819*  -2.374**  -4.193***  -4.103***  
 (0.776)  (0.918)  (1.030)  (0.864)  (0.797)  
ln(GDP 
PPP pc) 5.741 (5.213) 
8.231 
(5.673) 
7.117 
(5.734) 
9.977* 
(5.695) 
0.654 
(4.840) 
-0.036 
(4.998) 
-0.308 
(3.310) 
1.371 
(3.737) 
9.515** 
(3.886) 
8.842* 
(4.511) 
 
ln(GDP 
PPPpc)2 -0.453 (0.345) 
-0.701* 
(0.369) 
-0.506 
(0.376) 
-0.737** 
(0.366) 
-0.072 
(0.291) 
-0.094 
(0.300) 
0.022 
(0.200) 
-0.185 
(0.222) 
-0.545** 
(0.220) 
-0.603** 
(0.256) 
 
Schooling -0.743** -0.808** -0.909** -0.911** -0.815*** -1.020*** -0.636*** -1.175*** -0.631** -1.030*** 
 (0.316) (0.347) (0.356) (0.366) (0.304) (0.301) (0.235) (0.235) (0.242) (0.266) 
ln 
Population 0.191 (0.398) 
0.056 
(0.436) 
0.019 
(0.459) 
-0.143 
(0.463) 
0.089 
(0.484) 
-0.414 
(0.447) 
0.533 
(0.348) 
-0.231 
(0.352) 
0.700** 
(0.313) 
0.078 
(0.335) 
 
Constant 26.432 24.250 21.614 16.264 44.467* 60.459** 40.546** 56.499*** -2.417 20.036 
 (23.463) (25.815) (26.624) (27.181) (24.157) (23.941) (15.465) (17.156) (18.085) (20.384) 
 
Observations 48 48 60 60 66 66 83 83 78 78 
R2 0.822 0.779 0.676 0.652 0.569 0.531 0.715 0.627 0.683 0.567 
Adjusted R2 0.800 0.758 0.646 0.627 0.533 0.500 0.696 0.608 0.661 0.543 
Residual Std. 
Error 
3.002  
(df = 42) 
3.305  
(df = 43) 
3.965  
(df = 54) 
4.069  
(df = 55) 
4.490  
(df = 60) 
4.646 
 (df = 61) 
3.742  
(df = 77) 
4.249  
(df = 78) 
3.687  
(df = 72) 
4.283  
(df = 73) 
F Statistic 
38.690*** 
(df = 5; 
42) 
37.831*** 
(df = 4; 
43) 
22.489*** 
(df = 5; 
54) 
25.762*** 
(df = 4; 
55) 
15.855*** 
(df = 5; 
60) 
17.272*** 
(df = 4; 
61) 
38.549*** 
(df = 5; 
77) 
32.820*** 
(df = 4; 
78) 
31.076*** 
(df = 5; 
72) 
23.890*** 
(df = 4; 
73) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Notes: Per decade cross-section regression with GINI EHII. The effect of ECI is negative and significant. 
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Table A6. Per decade cross-sections with GINI All 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Per decade cross-section regression with Gini All. The effect of ECI is negative and significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable:GINI All 
   
   
 1970-79 1970-79 1980-89 1980-89 1990-99 1990-99 2000-08 2000-08 
    
ECI -2.298  -4.373
**  -6.294
***  -3.989
**  
 -1.824  -1.783  -1.867  -1.689  
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 34.641
*** 38.609*** 31.528*** 33.530*** 20.272*** 23.484*** 34.380*** 34.429*** 
 -9.487 -9.013 -8.794 -9.153 -6.589 -6.911 -6.829 -7.013 
ln(GDP 
PPPpc)2 -2.122
*** -2.435*** -1.866*** -2.127*** -1.037** -1.405*** -1.930*** -2.036*** 
 -0.626 -0.579 -0.55 -0.564 -0.405 -0.414 -0.397 -0.405 
Schooling -0.856 -0.804 -0.248 -0.406 -0.834* -1.516*** -1.096** -1.427*** 
 -0.562 -0.564 -0.54 -0.561 -0.484 -0.466 -0.474 -0.464 
ln Population 0.237 0.099 0.52 -0.199 1.017 0.024 0.533 0.006 
 -0.767 -0.765 -0.768 -0.743 -0.665 -0.632 -0.611 -0.584 
Constant -95.121** -104.858** -95.314** -82.141* -65.237** -46.523 -108.258*** -90.658
*** 
 -44.146 -43.775 -42.134 -43.688 -29.962 -31.208 -31.824 -31.77 
    
Observations 46 46 59 59 89 89 89 89 
R2 0.542 0.524 0.449 0.387 0.359 0.271 0.403 0.363 
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.478 0.397 0.341 0.32 0.237 0.367 0.332 
Residual Std. 
Error 
6.095 (df = 
40) 
6.138 7.03 7.35 7.756 (df = 
83) 
8.220 (df = 
84) 
7.506 7.708 
(df = 41) (df = 53) (df = 54) (df = 83) (df = 84) 
F Statistic 9.481
*** (df 
= 5; 40) 
11.293*** 
(df = 4; 41) 
8.643*** (df 
= 5; 53) 
8.509*** (df 
= 4; 54) 
9.301*** (df 
= 5; 83) 
7.819*** (df 
= 4; 84) 
11.200*** 11.955*** 
(df = 5; 
83) 
(df = 4; 
84) 
   
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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EFFECTS OF OTHER MEASURES OF EXPORT DIVERSITY, COMPLEXITY AND 
CONCENTRATION 
 
Table A7 reproduces the cross-sectional regression Table 1 from the paper, with the 
addition of the Fitness Index, Shannon Entropy, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). The results show that all of these measures are significant when included in the 
regression individually, however ECI explains a larger fraction of the variance in 
inequality. Notably, a higher economic concentration seems to lead to a higher level of 
income inequality, however this effect is not significant if economic complexity (ECI) is 
included.  
 
 
Table A7. Cross-Section Regression Results 
 
 Dependent variable: GINI EHII 
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ECI -0.040***     -0.036*** 
 (0.007)     (0.007) 
Fitness Index  -0.023***     
  (0.005)     
Entropy   -0.025***    
   (0.005)    
HHI    0.146***  0.058 
    (0.044)  (0.044) 
ln(GDP PPP pc) 0.067** 0.036 0.086*** 0.065** 0.059* 0.068** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) 
ln(GDP PPPpc)2 -0.004** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Schooling -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln Population 0.007** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.0001 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rule of Law -0.013 -0.008 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Corruption Control 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.027* 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Government 
Effectiveness 0.002 (0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.022 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.017)  
Political Stability -0.010 -0.011* -0.014** -0.017** -0.017** -0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Regulatory Quality -0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.0002 -0.012 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Voice and 
Accountability 0.001 (0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.008)  
Constant 0.083 0.199 0.132 0.206 0.286** 0.071 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.138) (0.141) (0.130) 
 
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 
R2 0.717 0.698 0.703 0.667 0.639 0.721 
Adjusted R2 0.693 0.672 0.678 0.639 0.612 0.695 
Residual Std. Error 0.035  (df = 130) 
0.036  
(df = 130) 
0.035  
(df = 130) 
0.037  
(df = 130) 
0.039  
(df = 131) 
0.034  
(df = 129) 
F Statistic 29.916
*** 
(df = 11; 130) 
27.282*** 
(df = 11; 130) 
28.014*** 
(df = 11; 130) 
23.698*** 
(df = 11; 130) 
23.208*** 
(df = 10; 131) 
27.720*** 
(df = 12; 129) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Notes: Pooled cross-section regression using different measures of productive structure, using GINI EHII as 
a dependent variable. ECI, Fitness Index, and Entropy are negatively correlated with Gini, and HHI is 
positively correlated with Gini. All regression coefficients between Gini and the four measures of productive 
structure are significant. 
 
 
Next, we compare the effects of ECI (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009), the Fitness Index 
(Tacchella et al., 2012), Shannon-Entropy (Shannon, 1948) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (Hirschman, 1945, Herfindahl, 1950) in fixed-effects panel regression (Table A8). 
The results show that, among these measures of productive structure, ECI is the only 
measure which is a significant predictor of time variations in inequality within countries 
over long periods of time.  
 
 
Table A8. Fixed-Effects Regression Results GINI EHII 
 
 Dependent variable:GINI EHII 
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ECI -2.189***     -2.302*** 
 (0.555)     (0.570) 
Fitness Index  -0.070     
  (0.075)     
Entropy   -0.067    
   (0.408)    
HHI    0.080  -2.054 
    (2.352)  (2.340) 
ln(GDP PPP pc) -1.541 
(2.915) 
-2.749 
(3.009) 
-3.285 
(3.044) 
-3.171 
(2.996) 
-3.182 
(2.973) 
-1.735 
(2.925)  
ln(GDP PPPpc)2 -0.019 
(0.181) 
0.015 
(0.188) 
0.049 
(0.189) 
0.043 
(0.187) 
0.044 
(0.186) 
-0.002 
(0.182)  
Schooling 1.380*** 1.475*** 1.444*** 1.454*** 1.453*** 1.334*** 
 (0.282) (0.291) (0.295) (0.294) (0.290) (0.287) 
ln Population -2.213** 
(1.098) 
-1.724 
(1.124) 
-1.708 
(1.142) 
-1.671 
(1.133) 
-1.675 
(1.122) 
-2.357** 
(1.111)  
 
Observations 335 335 335 335 335 335 
R2 0.216 0.167 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.219 
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.117 0.115 0.115 0.116 0.153 
Residual Std. 
Error 
12.959*** 
(df = 5; 235) 
9.448*** 
(df = 5; 235) 
9.242*** 
(df = 5; 235) 
9.236*** 
 (df = 5; 235) 
11.594*** 
(df = 4; 236) 
10.917*** 
(df = 6; 234) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Notes: Effects of different diversity measures in fixed-effects panel regressions, using GINI EHII 
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PRODUCT GINI INDEX 
 
This section analyzes the evolution of PGIs over time, and to which extent complex 
products are also more inclusive products. 
 
PGI ranking 
 
Table A9 shows the highest and lowest ranked five products in the PGI index between 
1995-2008. A full list of all 775 products can be found in a separate Appendix Table A12. 
 
Table A9. List of the 5 products with the highest and lowest PGI values between 1995-2008 
 
Notes: PGI Ranking: List of the 5 products with the respective highest and lowest PGI values between 1995-
2008. 
 
Descriptive statistics and evolution of PGIs 
 
As discussed in the paper, the PGIs associate each product with a level of income 
inequality by calculating the average Gini coefficient of the countries that produce the 
respective product, weighted by the product’s importance in the country’s economy. Table 
A10 shows summary statistics for the PGIs for each decade intervals. Due to limited data 
availability we exclude the period between 1963 and 1969.  
 
The average value of the PGIs increases over time, representing the trend found in recent 
research on inequality measures that countries are converging towards an average Gini 
value around 0.40 (Palma, 2011). However, despite this convergence trend, the spread 
between minimum and maximum value of the PGIs remains large. While the PGI value 
varied between 0.285 to 0.511 in the time period between 1970-1979, in the time period 
between 2000-2008 the values were distributed between 0.334 and 0.517. 
 
5 products with highest PGI 
SITC4 Product Name  Product Section PGI 
721 Cocoa Beans Food and live animals 0.506 
814 Inedible Flours of Meat and Fish Food and live animals 0.505 
2683 Fine Animal Hair Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0.503 
6545 Jute Woven Fabrics Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0.499 
2875 Zinc Ore Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0.498 
    
5 products with lowest PGI 
SITC4  Product Name  Product Section PGI 
7259 Paper Making Machine Parts Machinery and transport equipment 0.334 
7244 Textile Machinery Machinery and transport equipment 0.336 
7233 Road Rollers Machinery and transport equipment 0.338 
2120 Raw Furs Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 0.338 
7252 Paper Making Machines Machinery and transport equipment 0.340 
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Table A11 illustrates that the PGI values for different decades are highly correlated with 
each other, and that this correlation—as expected—tends to decline over time. 
 
Table A10. Descriptive statistics of PGI values for different decades 
 
Time period Mean Std. Min Mmax 
1970-1979 0.367 0.043 0.285 0.512 
1980-1989 0.383 0.042 0.305 0.504 
1990-1999 0.403 0.039 0.327 0.496 
2000-2008 0.418 0.038 0.337 0.518 
 
 
Table A11. Correlation coefficient between PGI values from different decades 
 
PGI value 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-08 
1970-1979 1.000 0.879 0.734 0.667 
1980-1989  1.000 0.841 0.746 
1990-1999   1.000 0.869 
2000-2008    1.000 
 
 
Correlation between PGI and product complexity 
 
Figure A2 illustrates a strong and negative correlation between PGI and the Product 
Complexity Index (PCI) (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014; Felipe et 
al., 2012) for different decades. In other words, more complex industrial products tend to 
be associated with lower levels of inequality. 
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Figure A2. Bivariate relationship between the Product Complexity Index (PCI) and the Product Gini Index 
(PGI) in the (A) 1970-1979, (B) 1980-1989, (C) 1990-1999 and (D) 2000-2008 
 
